Estimating credit and profit scoring of a Brazilian credit union with logistic regression and machine-learning techniques by Paula, Daniel Abreu Vasconcellos de et al.
Estimating credit and proﬁt
scoring of a Brazilian credit union
with logistic regression and
machine-learning techniques
Daniel Abreu Vasconcellos de Paula, Rinaldo Artes,
Fabio Ayres and Andrea Maria Accioly Fonseca Minardi
Insper, São Paulo, SP, Brazil
Abstract
Purpose – Although credit unions are nonproﬁt organizations, their objectives depend on the efﬁcient
management of their resources and credit risk aligned with the principles of the cooperative doctrine. This
paper aims to propose the combined use of credit scoring and proﬁt scoring to increase the effectiveness of the
loan-granting process in credit unions.
Design/methodology/approach – This sample is composed by the data of personal loans transactions
of a Brazilian credit union.
Findings – The analysis reveals that the use of statistical methods improves signiﬁcantly the predictability of
default when compared to the use of subjective techniques and the superiority of the random forests model in
estimating credit scoring and proﬁt scoring when compared to logit and ordinary least squares method (OLS)
regression. The study also illustrates how both analyses can be used jointly for more effective decision-making.
Originality/value – Replacing subjective analysis with objective credit analysis using deterministic
models will beneﬁt Brazilian credit unions. The credit decision will be based on the input variables and on
clear criteria, turning the decision-making process impartial. The joint use of credit scoring and proﬁt scoring
allows granting credit for the clients with the highest potential to pay debt obligation and, at the same time, to
certify that the transaction proﬁtability meets the goals of the organization: to be sustainable and to provide
loans and investment opportunities at attractive rates to members.
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1. Introduction
Credit unions use the ﬁnancial resources raised via members to ﬁnance the loans of the same
members. Mutual help with accessible conditions increases the ﬁnancial returns of the
community associated with the union over time (Polônio, 1999).
At the end of each ﬁscal year, the union returns the surplus to their members, either by
cash distributions proportional to members’ contributions and uses or by reinvesting it in
the union, as stated in the bylaws (Geriz, 2010).
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Although proﬁt is not the main objective of these organizations, they have to remain
competitive to survive. Cooperatives need to implement liquidity and solvency controls, to
search for economies of scale and to manage their ﬁnancial assets efﬁciently (Silva Filho,
2002). Silva Filho (2002) advocates that credit unions should use management tools to
measure performance and achieve goals to increase the effectiveness of the decision-making
process.
The organizational structure of credit unions may create agency problems in the process
of approving loans (Lima, Araújo, & Amaral, 2008). When a member applies for a loan in
his or her institution, the granting decision depends on the judgment of the credit analyst
who is designated by the credit union administration to assess the creditworthiness of its
members. The fact that the members of a credit union are also its owners makes the
judgment of the credit analyst vulnerable to the inﬂuence of applicants. Some members may
seek beneﬁts divergent of the best interest of the cooperative, as, for instance, insolvent
debtors wanting to renegotiate bad loans.
The lack of objectivity in credit policies and the absence of reasonable internal controls
are obstacles that hinder the sustainable growth of a credit union (Giarola, Santos, &
Ferreira, 2009). Comparatively, major Brazilian ﬁnancial institutions have been investing
substantial amount of capital in technology for credit systems in retail operations. They use
sophisticated statistical methods to open accounts, approve credit, determine limits, extend
loans and perform collection actions to make the internal processes more efﬁcient and allow
for a credit portfolio, which is well balanced with the expected levels of risk and return.
In this context, credit risk modeling and loan proﬁtability forecasting are useful
resources to improve the performance of credit unions.
Credit scoring models are widely used in the ﬁnancial industry to measure credit risk.
The model estimates default probability (DP) based on customers’ past behavioral and
demographic characteristics (Lewis, 1992).
Proﬁt scoring models are used to predict the proﬁtability of a client or a transaction. This
approach is based on the concept that nondefaulting borrowers may not generate sufﬁcient
revenue to offset the costs of maintaining their accounts, whereas defaulting borrowers may
be proﬁtable if they actively engage in credit transactions and honor most of their
commitments (Sanchez-Barrios, Andreeva, & Ansell, 2016). The methodology addresses
decisions regarding the selection of the desired risk combined with a return level and the
formulation of strategies to acquire and retain proﬁtable clients (Sanchez-Barrios et al.,
2016).
Lima et al. (2008) argue that the agency conﬂict in credit unions can be mitigated by the
adoption of efﬁcient internal controls and clear governance rules.
We propose the use of a credit-scoring model combined with a proﬁt scoring model for
loan-granting decisions, determining an acceptable credit risk without excessive loss of
proﬁtability. The combined use of these approaches may improve the credit concession
process, by not only lending to clients with the potential to pay off debt but also considering
the expected proﬁtability of the operation. It may reduce the agency problems and may
improve the efﬁciency of credit unions, increasing the long-term viability of the
organization. We expect that a process based strictly on objective and quantitative analyses
provides loans suited for its members without favoring minor groups at the expense of the
whole.
We contribute to the literature by comparing logistic and machine-learning approaches
to subjective methods, and by combining credit scoring to proﬁt scoring in a credit union
context. As credit unions are private, it is difﬁcult to have access to their data, and we are
not aware of a similar analysis in Brazil. We had access to data of loans transactions granted
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in 2015 and 2016 for only one credit union, but as the agency problems and granting
processes are similar, our main ﬁndings will probably be applied to most corporations. Our
results indicate that logistic models increase the GINI coefﬁcient by 5.8 times when
compared to subjective analyses and the area under the ROC curve (AUROC) by around 62
per cent. The random forest increases the GINI index further by 4 per cent and the AUROC
by 2 per cent. We conclude that statistic models improve the efﬁciency of credit granting
signiﬁcantly.
2. Theoretical basis
Modern cooperatives emerged in 1844 in Rochdale, England, during the Industrial
Revolution (Pinheiro, 2008). A group of weavers founded a cooperative based on ethical and
behavioral principles, which have become the basis of contemporary cooperativism.
Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen founded the pioneering institution that served as a model for
credit union activities in Germany in 1847. The German rural cooperatives had the following
characteristics: unlimited and joint liability of members, that is, the member is accountable
for debts contracted by the organization by pledging his or her private assets as collateral;
members’ votes have equal weights, regardless of their equity stake; and nondistribution of
proﬁts, surpluses or dividends. In 1856, Herman Schulze created the ﬁrst urban credit union
of Germany. The cooperatives founded by Herman Schulze differ from those of Raiffeisen’s
because they return dividends to members proportionally to their equity stake. The
cooperatives that follow these rules are now known as cooperatives with a Schulze–
Delitzschmodel.
The ﬁrst credit union in Brazil was Sociedade Cooperativa Caixa de Economia e
Empréstimos de Nova Petropolis, founded in Rio Grande do Sul in 1902 (Soares & Melo
Sobrinho, 2008). It was a Raiffeisen-type cooperative, and it remains operational until today.
After this pioneering initiative, other credit unions were created to serve rural communities.
Credit unions are ﬁnancial institutions regulated by the Central Bank of Brazil through
Resolution No. 4434 of 2015 ruled by the National Monetary Council. The liability of the
partners may be limited or unlimited, as determined by the bylaws (Geriz, 2010).
In Brazil, credit unions have grown signiﬁcantly in recent years along with their
representativeness in the banking sector. Table I illustrates the growth of cooperatives in
terms of assets and equity compared with consolidated banking data.
The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of credit-unions aggregate equity (net worth,
assets, deposits and credit portfolio) between 2011 and 2016 was in the range of 18 to 22 per
cent. This exceeded the growth rate of other ﬁnancial institutions. The representativeness of
credit unions jumped from 4.1 per cent in 2011 to 6.6 per cent in 2016 of the consolidated
banking sector net worth.
Despite not being the dominant model in the banking sector, not-for-proﬁt ﬁnancial
institutions, like credit unions, play an important role in many countries (Canning,
Jefferson, & Spencer, 2003). However, literature on credit unions is little when compared to
other ﬁnancial institutions (Cuevas & Fischer, 2006).
Credit unions offer lower interest rates to their members and return part of the cash
surplus (the difference between revenues and operating expenses) to them if approved by
the general assembly (Giarola et al., 2009). Those are advantages in comparison to other
credit institutions. However, credit unions have to retain an adequate level of cash surplus to
make the necessary investments in operating assets and risk management to offer lower
interest rates and retain clients with higher credit risk in a highly competitive sector
dominated by large institutions.
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Giarola et al. (2009) explain that credit union ﬁnancial resources are mostly generated by
deposits and the acquisition of equity by members, which are then transferred as loans to
other members. Therefore, poor management affects all members negatively.
Lima et al. (2008) argue that the most important advantage of credit unions is the access
to ﬁnancial services to their members, even during credit rationing in the conventional
ﬁnancial market. The reduced tax burden is an important competitive advantage that allows
cooperatives to have lower costs than other ﬁnancial institutions in the retail sector.
The agency problem is a risk factor for the long-term sustainability of credit unions
(Cuevas & Fischer, 2006). The agency theory postulates that the main interest of
shareholders is proﬁt maximization (Cornforth, 2004). Characteristics of the corporate
control market, such as pressure from major shareholders, takeover threats and board
monitoring align managers’ interest with this goal. In cooperatives, the situation is different:
they are established to serve the interests of their members; therefore, proﬁt is a way to
achieve a purpose and not a purpose itself.
Agency conﬂict has particular characteristics in credit unions: First, cooperative owners
are also clients. Conﬂicts of interests between lenders and borrowers occur due to
heterogeneity in customer preference for proﬁtable applications or loans with attractive
rates. Second, decisions made at a general assembly, including election of the administrative
staff, are based on the vote of each member, with no distinction by individual equity stake.
Finally, the members elected to the board are usually less technically qualiﬁed than experts
working in the ﬁnancial industry (Lima et al., 2008).
The more homogeneous the long-term concerns of the members, the lower the agency
costs (Souza, 2017), and the vote will express the desire of the majority. Conversely, in highly
heterogeneous credit unions, decisions will greatly differ among members. Therefore,
shareholder organizations, whose proﬁt maximization objective is better deﬁned and
achievable, tend to present more advantages (Hart &Moore, 1998).
Table I.
Growth of credit
unions in Brazil (R$bn)
Segment Aggregate equity 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 CAGR (%)
Credit unions Net worth 16 19 23 27 32 37 18
(% growth) 21 18 20 17 15
Assets 86 104 124 151 183 222 21
(% growth) 20 20 21 21 22
Deposits 38 47 56 69 83 104 22
(% growth) 23 20 22 21 25
Credit portfolio 36 46 58 68 76 84 18
(% growth) 26 27 18 12 10
Banking sector
(excluding credit
unions)
Net worth 371 439 433 459 481 519 7
(% growth) 18 1 6 5 8
Assets 4,274 4,981 5,456 6,199 6,863 6,935 10
(% growth) 17 10 14 11 1
Deposits 1,595 1,647 1,751 1,830 1,928 1,957 4
(% growth) 3 6 5 5 2
Credit portfolio 1,667 1,947 2,273 2,538 2,990 2,633 10
(% growth) 17 17 12 18 12
Representativeness
of credit unions
Net worth (%) 4.1 4.2 5.0 5.6 6.2 6.6
Assets (%) 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 3.1
Deposits (%) 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.6 4.1 5.0
Credit portfolio (%) 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.5 3.1
Source: Banco Central do Brasil
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The identiﬁcation of variables related to the credit quality of members allows statistical
and objective control of lending processes, increasing scalability and impartiality in
decision-making, thereby reducing agency costs for the cooperative.
Credit unions operate on behalf of all members, and they are not motivated by proﬁt
(Taylor, 1971; Spencer, 1996). Members will most likely play both roles: lenders and
borrowers. As long as the difference between the borrowers’ and lenders’ rates is
reduced, credit unions have incentives to expand. The difference between borrowers
and lenders’ rates covers the long-run average costs of the unions. The combination of
proﬁt and credit scoring models may turn the credit granting process more efﬁcient,
thus reducing the average long-term cost of the union. This can result in a lower
difference between borrowers and lenders’ rate and, consequently, in a higher incentive
for the credit union to expand.
3. Methodology
3.1 Credit and proﬁt scoring models
Fisher (1936) introduced the discriminant analysis, and Durand (1941) pioneered in
proposing a credit-scoring model. Since the second half of the twentieth century, credit-
scoring models have become a benchmark for the ﬁnancial industry.
Proﬁt-scoring modeling has emerged as part of a credit granting decision-making tool.
Borrowers are grouped according to proﬁtability ratios instead of default probabilities and
credit losses (Sanchez-Barrios et al., 2016).
The increase in computational processing capacity enabled ﬁnancial institutions to use
more efﬁcient models based on machine-learning techniques (Yap, Ong, & Husain, 2011).
These techniques may have higher accuracy and robustness in analyzing nonlinear
relationships than traditional techniques.
Decision trees (Srinivisan & Kim, 1987), artiﬁcial neural networks (Malhotra &Malhotra,
2003), k-nearest neighbors (West, 2000) and support vector machines (Schebesch &
Stecking, 2005) are examples of techniques used for credit-scoring modeling. Logistic
regression (So, Thomas, & Seow, 2014), artiﬁcial neural networks (Verbraken, Bravo, &
Baesens, 2014), survival analysis (Sanchez-Barrios et al., 2016) and chi-square automatic
interaction detector (Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2016) stand out among the techniques
used for proﬁt scoring modeling.
3.2 Random forests
Random forest (Breiman, 2001) is a machine-learning technique that combines decision trees
(Breiman, Friedman, & Stone, 1984). It may be used for data classiﬁcation (categorical
dependent variable) and regression (continuous dependent variable) problems, and it is an
evolution of the bootstrap aggregating (bagging) algorithm (Breiman, 1996).
The classiﬁcation and regression trees, proposed by Breiman et al. (1984), seeks the
creation of homogeneous subsets by successive binary partitioning of data, until
meeting predeﬁned quality (or purity) criteria. The values or categories of the
dependent variable are predicted based on the end nodes of the decision tree. Figure 1
exempliﬁes a decision tree.
Figure 1 shows the process of binary data partitioning into classes. From the root node,
the variable that enables a better separation of groups according to a quality criterion is
selected, yielding two new nodes. The process continues recursively, until meeting the
stopping criteria.
In the bagging method, the data set is randomly divided into a large number of
subsamples drawn from the original sample with replacement, generating a classiﬁcation or
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regression tree for each subsample. The prediction is calculated as the mean (for regression)
or the vote majority (for classiﬁcation) of the responses of the trees generated with the
subsamples. This technique generates more precise and stable results because the effects of
noise and outliers are attenuated with the various samplings.
A key limitation of the bagging technique is the possibility of generating very similar
trees, which in turn increases the prediction error rate of the model because the independent
variables are always the same.
The random forests method has two steps in addition to the selection of subsamples
performed in the bagging technique. Having M predictor variables in the data set, m <
M variables will be randomly selected for each subsample in the construction of
individual trees. The m value is kept constant during the model learning process. This
feature enables reduction of prediction errors due to multicollinearity problems, for
example.
When applied to credit-scoring prediction, random forest frequently exhibits better
performance than conventional techniques (Jones, Johnstone, & Wilson, 2015; Lessmann,
Baesens, & Thomas, 2015; Malekipirbazari & Aksakalli, 2015; Namvar, Siami, Rabhi, &
Naderpour, 2018).
We estimated the credit-scoring models with logistic regression to verify whether the
accuracy of the subjective analysis increases when including demographic and behavioral
variables. Subsequently, we compared the results with the one obtained from the random
forest algorithm. The comparisons are based on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) statistics,
the Gini coefﬁcient and the AUROC.
Figure 1.
Representation of
classiﬁcation trees
Root node
Intermediate Node
Intermediate Node
End node End node
End node
End node
Gender
Age
Marital Status
Male Female
>30<=30
Single or DivorcedMarried
1ª split
2ª split
3rd split
Category % n
Good 96% 700
Bad 4% 30
Total 100% 730
Category % n
Good 74% 274
Bad 26% 97
Total 100% 371
Category % n
Good 79% 324
Bad 21% 85
Total 100% 409
Category % n
Good 15% 136
Bad 85% 783
Total 100% 919
Category % n
Good 51% 1240
Bad 49% 1189
Total 100% 2429
Category % n
Good 43% 734
Bad 57% 965
Total 100% 1699
Category % n
Good 35% 460
Bad 65% 868
Total 100% 1328
Source: (Silverio, 2015) 
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4. Data description
We obtained our data from a Brazilian credit union. Behavioral and demographic variables
of loans were observed in a 24-month period (from January 2015 to December 2016), totaling
2,012 observations. We considered personal loan transactions only. The credit union did not
register rejected applications.
Each database record is a unique credit transaction that contains information about the
characteristics of the loan, the borrower and the development of the outstanding balance.
The last set includes the payment history, overdue payments and end-of-month ﬁnancial
statements.
We classify a client as a “bad” payer if he or she does not pay off their debt commitments
within 90 days after the due date; and “good” otherwise.
We used the internal rate of return (IRR) on the loans as a proﬁtability measure in proﬁt
scoring models, as proposed by Serrano-Cinca and Gutiérrez-Nieto (2016). The IRR
calculation parameters are the cash ﬂows of payments received and the costs involved in
each contracted operation.
We used the following variables:
 Type: type of credit operation chosen by the applicant, such as personal loan, loan
for acquiring goods and payroll loan;
 Rating: the credit rating subjectively assigned by the credit union to the loan
transaction based on the client’s payment history records and information provided
by credit bureaus such as Credit Protection Service and Serasa-Experian;
 Income: the borrowers’ proven monthly net income in Brazilian real;
 Collateral: information about available goods or property that can be used as
collateral;
 Reltime: time elapsed between the date the checking account was opened and the
date the loan transaction was settled, in years;
 Interest: nominal interest rate of the transaction;
 Value: value of the loan requested by the borrower in Brazilian real;
 Debt: Debt to disposable income ratio: the ratio between the value of the loan
installment and the monthly income of the borrower;
 Evhist: number of months since the last occurrence of a late payment (delay higher than
30 days after the credit obligation due date) of a speciﬁc client in the past two years. In
case there are no observed events for a given customer, this variable is zero; and
 Term: Term in days corresponding to the period between the transaction date and
the contractually agreed loan settlement date.
The credit-scoring dependent variable Y receives value 0 (zero) if the client is “bad” and
value 1 (one) if the client is “good.”Table II shows the statistics of variable Y in the sample.
The dependent variable of the proﬁt score model is the IRR on the transactions.
Table II.
Dependent variable
of credit risk
classiﬁcation
Events related to the dependent variable Quantity (%)
Operations with at least 90 days of delay (BAD) 174 9
Operations with less than 90 days of delay (GOOD) 1838 91
Total 2012 100
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Figure 2 shows the histogram and statistics of the IRR-dependent variable. We
observed that the distribution is asymmetric. The default events markedly shift the left
tail of the distribution because these events are associated with signiﬁcant losses. The
distribution of the positive IRR values is concentrated in the range of rates of return
from 5 to 15 per cent.
Table III shows the descriptive analysis of the categorized independent variables. In each
line, for each possible value of the categorical variables, one may ﬁnd information regarding
the number of bad or good clients in the sample and descriptive statistics for IRR. We
applied chi-square homogeneity tests to assess whether the ratios of good and bad payers
differ between the categories of the independent variables and the mean comparison test
(analysis of variance – ANOVA) between the different possible values of the independent
variables regarding the IRR. All tests, except for the COLLATERAL variable, identiﬁed
signiﬁcant differences at p< 0.01.
Figure 2.
Histogram of the
internal rate of return
Table III.
Descriptive statistics
of discrete variables
Credit classification Internal rate of return
Variable Values BAD Y = 0 GOOD Y = 1 Mean Median SD
TYPE Other loans 39 43 9.44 2.64 56.46
Personal loans 104 1380 4.09 7.64 21.95
Payday loans 11 399 8.88 10.26 13.20
Vehicle ﬁnancing 20 16 30.56 4.55 52.08
RATING Rating Non-A 27 4 23.82 5.54 63.02
Rating A 147 1834 4.33 8.00 23.17
COLLATERAL Secured loans 157 1733 3.95 7.89 24.06
Unsecured loans 17 105 3.07 10.83 30.55
INCOME R$1000 or less 10 32 4.02 8.00 39.91
R$1000-R$3000 107 1121 4.93 8.25 23.32
R$3000-R$6000 26 487 4.84 7.16 19.48
Greater than R$ 6000 31 198 2.30 7.73 34.17
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We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between “good” and “bad” in the COLLATERAL
variable according to the F-ANOVA test (p> 0.10). This indicates that there is no signiﬁcant
contribution from COLLATERAL to the proﬁt scoring models.
Table IV contains the descriptive analysis of the continuous independent variables. In
each line, we present, for each variable, some descriptive statistics, the observed means for
bad and good payers and the correlation between the variable and IRR. We used the t-test to
compare the means of the independent variables between good and bad payers. Although
the normality assumption of t-test is not achieved, the large sample size enables us to carry
out the tests. We found signiﬁcant correlations between IRR and all continuous variables,
except for the variables VALUE, DEBT and TERM.
Variables VALUE and TERM are nonsigniﬁcant in all statistical tests. The results of the
t-test improved after we applied the transformations of the variables outlined in Table V.
The value of the variance inﬂation factor (VIF) for the lnVALUE variable was 4.40,
suggesting multicollinearity problems. When we excluded the maximum value, the VIF was
1.37, indicating the absence of strongmulticollinearity among the variables.
The general speciﬁcation of the logistic and linear models used in the paper is given,
respectively, by the expressions (1) and (2):
log
pi
1 pi
 
¼ b 0 þ
Xk
j¼1
b kx ji (1)
where pi is the probability of the client i be good, k is the number of independent
variables in the model, xji is the value of the independent variable j for client i and b j
are parameters, i = 1, . . ., n, j = 1, . . ., k:
Table V.
Transformed
variables used in the
credit-scoring model
Variable Description
LnRELTIME Natural logarithm of RELTIME
lnVALUE Natural logarithm of VALUE
lnDEBT Natural logarithm of DEBT
sqrtEVHIST Square root of EVHIST
sqrtTERM Square root of TERM
Table IV.
Descriptive statistics
of continuous
variables
Descriptive analysis Relationship with the dependent variable
Credit classification
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum SD
Mean for Bad
(Y = 0)
Mean for Good
(Y = 1)
Correlation
coefficient with IRR
RELTIME 6.25 17.00 0.10 5.27 2.74* 6.58* 0.10**
INTEREST 28.14 241.66 12.68 12.08 42.71* 26.76* 0.18**
VALUE 3912 106500 100 5252 4386 3867 0.01
DEBT 12.48 156.28 0.01 13.24 16.70* 12.08* 0.03
EVHIST 0.14 16.00 0.00 0.98 0.64* 0.09* 0.15**
TERM 515 1837 14 309 545 512 0.02
Notes: *p < 0.01 – Signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Student t-test); **p < 0.01 – signiﬁcant at the 1% level
(Pearson correlation coefﬁcient)
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IRRi ¼ b 0 þ
Xk
j¼1
b kx ji þ « i (2)
where IRRi is the value of IRR for client i, the others terms are similar to those previously
described.
5. Results and discussion
We used the R programming language (R Core Team, 2000) to ﬁt the models, and the
randomForest package (Svetnik, Liaw, & Tong, 2003).
5.1 Credit scoring models
We developed three logistic regression models. Model 1 (complete model) contains all
independent variables selected for the study. Model 2 excludes the RATING variable. Model
3 contains only the RATING variable. Model 3 allows us to evaluate the performance of the
current criterion used by the cooperative to decide if a credit should be provided; Model 2
uses all the information available, except the information provided by RATING, and Model
1 uses all the information available.
Table VI shows the analyses results. We observed that the complete Model 1 performs
better than Model 3 and slightly better than, albeit very similar to, Model 2. Model 2
performs better than Model 3, which suggests that including other variables is more
beneﬁcial to the risk classiﬁcation than using the RATING variable alone (subjective credit
risk classiﬁcation).
The variables COLLATERAL, lnDEBT, INCOME (greater than R$6,000) and TYPE
(other loans) are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table VI.
Logistic regression
models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable coef. p s.e. coef. p s.e. coef. p s.e.
(Intercept) 1.03 0.353 1.11 2.61 0.006 0.96 1.91 <0.001 0.54
TYPE
Payday loans 2.98 <0.001 0.55 3.00 <0.001 0.55
Personal loans 2.38 <0.001 0.47 2.28 <0.001 0.46
Other loans 0.13 0.839 0.66 0.06 0.927 0.63
RATING 3.88 <0.001 0.64 4.43 <0.001 0.54
INCOME
R$ 1000-R$3000 1.01 0.047 0.51 1.01 0.039 0.49
R$ 3000 – R$ 6000 1.39 0.015 0.57 1.32 0.015 0.54
Greater than R$ 6000 0.12 0.837 0.58 0.28 0.613 0.56
lnRELTIME 0.50 <0.001 0.10 0.48 <0.001 0.10
COLLATERAL 0.22 0.554 0.37 0.15 0.680 0.37
INTEREST 0.07 <0.001 0.01 0.07 <0.001 0.01
nDEBT 0.01 0.964 0.13 0.02 0.889 0.13
sqrtEVHIST 1.55 <0.001 0.20 1.76 <0.001 0.21
sqrtTERM 0.06 <0.001 0.02 0.05 <0.001 0.02
N 2012 2012 2012
AUROC 0.94 0.93 0.58
GINI 0.88 0.86 0.15
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The analysis of the signs of the TYPE variable shows that the product “Vehicle Purchase”
has a higher credit risk than personal loan and unsecured loan products.
Themodel with the random forests technique created 500 classiﬁcation trees, of depth 3.
Table VII outlines the quality indicators (AUROC, KS and Gini) associated with the
logistic regression and random forest algorithm models (1). We observed that the random
forest modeling performed better than the logistic regression according to the three
indicators, in agreement with Jones et al. (2015), Lessmann et al. (2015), Malekipirbazari and
Aksakalli (2015) and Namvar et al. (2018).
The size of the sample provided by the cooperative was not big enough to enable the
partition of the data between a developing and a validation sample, so, to evaluate the
performance of the techniques with out-of-sample data, we used the k-fold (Kohavi, 1995)
cross-validation method to assess the generalizability of the models. In this method, we
randomly partitioned the data into 15 mutually exclusive groups (k = 15). By excluding a
partition, we generated a model from the data collected for the remained partitions, which
was subsequently assessed with the partition removed. The cross-validation ﬁndings were
very similar to those assessed when using the model developed with all database
observations, indicating that the random forests technique is better than the logistic
regression technique. The minimum value of the KS statistic for the logistic model was 0.66,
and the maximum was 0.70; conversely, for the random forests, the minimum value was
0.90, and the maximum value was 0.92. The minimum value of the Gini coefﬁcient for the
logistic regression model was 0.86, and the maximum was 0.88; the minimum value of the
random forests was 0.90, and themaximumwas 0.93.
5.2 Proﬁt score model
We compared the proﬁt score model developed herein by using the random forest technique
to the model estimated by the ordinary least squares method with robust heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors.
To attenuate problems due to the lack of linearity of the dependent variable and to
improve the performance of the ordinary least squares regression model, we added
quadratic variables to the set of continuous variables. Table VIII summarizes these
variables.
For the proﬁt scoring models, we used the same categorized variables used in the credit-
scoring model.
Table IX contains the results of the regression analyses.
Table VII.
Comparison of the
performance of credit
scoring models
Models AUROC KS Gini
Logistic regression (Model 1) 0.94 0.69 0.88
Random forest 0.96 0.90 0.92
Table VIII.
Quadratic variables
added to the proﬁt-
scoring model
Variable Description
RELTIME_QUAD Square of RELTIME
INTEREST_QUAD Square of INTEREST
DEBT_QUAD Square of DEBT
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The results show that the variables RELTIME, INTEREST, DEBT and their respective
quadratic terms RELTIME_QUAD, INTEREST_QUAD and DEBT_QUAD are statistically
signiﬁcant, which suggests a nonlinear relationship between these variables and the IRR.
Considering the amplitude observed in the sample (see minimum and maximum values in
Table IV) of RELTIME and DEBT, the tests conﬁrm a positive association between these
variables and IRR. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between IRR and
INTEREST, with maximum IRR value of 60 per cent.
The variables RATING, COLLATERAL and INCOME (greater than R$6,000) are not
statistically signiﬁcant, as expected by the descriptive analysis results. Few observations
(229 cases) have INCOME variable (greater than R$6,000) equal to 1, which may have
contributed to the nonsigniﬁcant p value. The results for the RATING variable suggest that
subjective credit scoring does not affect signiﬁcantly the IRR of transactions. The variable
TERM has a different sign in the proﬁt-scoring model than it does in the credit-scoring
model. This suggests that the transaction proﬁtability increases with maturity.
The random forest technique used the same variables of the regression models. Table X
shows the performance indicators for both methodologies. The mean squared error (MSE) of
the random forests model (MSE = 183.29) is considerably lower than the MSE of the linear
regression model (MSE = 427.61). This is consistent with the comparison using the
Table IX.
OLS regression with
robust standard
errors
robust standard error
Term Coefficient Standard error Z p
(Intercept) 60.230 14.385 4.187 3.E-05***
TYPE
Payday loans 28.018 6.595 4.248 2.E-05***
Personal loans 25.976 6.614 3.928 9.E-05***
Other loans 25.734 8.186 3.144 2.E-03***
RATING 12.492 10.538 1.185 0.24
INCOME
R$ 1000-R$3000 9.560 5.490 1.741 0.08*
R$ 3000-R$6000 9.373 5.524 1.697 0.09*
Greater than R$ 6000 5.462 5.728 0.953 0.34
RELTIME 1.224 0.492 2.486 0.01***
RELTIME_QUAD 0.021 0.004 5.394 7.E-08***
COLLATERAL 3.049 2.898 1.052 0.29
INTEREST 0.358 0.166 2.157 0.03**
INTEREST_QUAD 0.003 0.001 4.315 2.E-05***
DEBT 3.471 0.774 4.486 7.E-06***
DEBT_QUAD 0.002 0.001 2.021 0.04**
sqrtEVHIST 27.718 5.624 4.929 8.E-07***
sqrtTERM 0.242 0.085 2.829 5.E-03***
Notes: *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01
Table X.
Proﬁt-scoring
modeling results
MSE random forest MSE linear regression R2 random forest R2 linear regression
183.29 427.61 0.70 0.29
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coefﬁcients of determination. The random forests model has a higher explanatory power for
the values observed (0.70) than does the linear regressionmodel (0.29).
Similar to the credit-scoring models, we used the k-fold cross-validation method (Kohavi,
1995) to assess the generalizability of the proﬁt-scoring models. We observed MSE values
ranging from 409.68 to 439.32 for the linear regression and values ranging from 175.70 to
202.41 for the random forest. Conversely, the R2 statistic ranged from 0.27 to 0.30 for the
linear regression model and from 0.67 to 0.71 for the random forest model.
5.3 Joint analysis of credit scoring and proﬁt scoring
Joint analysis of credit scoring and proﬁt scoring may improve decision-making by
identifying the worst credit score that can be accepted without losing proﬁtability of the
loan portfolio and keeping the risk of losses due to default at an acceptable level.
Figure 3 shows the mean, median and 1, 5, 95 and 99 per cent percentiles of the expected
IRR as a function of the predicted DP. This is an exploratory analysis due to limitations of
the database. We observed that only 5 per cent of the clients classiﬁed with a 0.2 DP have an
IRR less than 0 per cent and that 1 per cent of these clients have a predicted IRR less than
20 per cent. The mean and median portfolio varies little, with a slight increase in mean
return: 6.7 per cent IRR for a DP of 0, and 7 per cent IRR for a DP of approximately 0.13,
subsequently falling slightly and then more sharply for DPs greater than 0.7.
6. Conclusions
The objective of credit unions is to lend money at accessible rates to people that face credit
restriction. Those people join the unions to borrow and to invest ﬁnancial resources in a
mutual ﬁnancial help system. To have a sustained operation, credit unions must be efﬁcient
in the credit granting decision, reducing the exposition to severe losses caused by default of
credit obligations. Therefore, credit risk analysis is crucial to the survival of credit unions.
Subjective credit analysis is still very common in Brazilian credit unions. It brings both
operational and moral risks to these cooperatives because loans may be granted to clients
Figure 3.
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with high credit risks. Agency problems may arise, as the loan applicant is also a member of
the cooperative; the agent that will make the credit granting decision is appointed by the
board of directors, and the board of directors is elected by themembers of the credit union.
Replacing subjective analysis with objective credit analysis using deterministic models
will beneﬁt credit unions. The credit decision will be based on the input variables and on
clear criteria, turning the decision-making process impartial. The deﬁnition of a cut-off
credit quality will allow deﬁning the maximum acceptable level of risk for new transactions,
and therefore risk management. The choice of independent variables related to credit risk is
a basic condition for the objective analysis to present satisfactory results.
According to the logistic regression model, the following variables are signiﬁcant (p <
0.05) in discriminating “bad” and “good” clients: type of transaction, subjective credit risk
rating, income, length of banking relationship, interest rates, history of defaults and
transaction term. However, our analysis has limitations due to data constraints. The sample
loan transactions are hired and ﬁnalized in a two-year period (from 2015 to 2016). Because
vehicle-ﬁnancing products have longer maturities, the analysis of the impact of this variable
in the default prediction would demand a longer period of data collection.
The joint use of credit scoring and proﬁt scoring allows granting credit for the clients
with the highest potential to pay off debt commitments and, at the same time, to certify that
the transaction proﬁtability meets the goals of the organization: to be sustainable and to
provide loans and investment opportunities at attractive rates to members.
We used logistic and random forest analysis (a machine-learning technique) for
accessing credit scoring for clients. We used OLS and random forest analysis to assess the
proﬁt scoring of clients.
The values of the Gini and AUROC indicators suggest that the credit-scoring models
have a much higher predictive quality than subjective analyses. This evidence supports the
literature, according to which subjective credit analysis performs worse than objective credit
analysis.
The random forest technique performs better than the logistic regression method for
credit scoring. We expect that machine-learning techniques will improve the cooperative
ﬁnancial performance, as the losses avoided will not translate into additional costs for the
organization.
A combination of proﬁt scoring and credit scoring analysis enables us to assess the effect
on the mean proﬁtability of the loan portfolio and the risk of losses caused by accepting
clients with worse credit quality. This is a useful tool for loan decision-making. The savings
generated help to reduce funding rates by improving the supply of credit, thereby
contributing to the objectives of the credit union.
For future research studies, we suggest using other popular machine-learning
techniques, such as artiﬁcial neural networks and support vector machines, for modeling of
credit scoring in credit unions. For proﬁt scoring, we suggest proﬁtability analysis using the
risk-adjusted return on capital as the dependent variable. Regularization techniques, such as
lasso and elastic net, can be used to eliminate coefﬁcients that are mostly irrelevant to the
explanation for the observed effects. We can use the survival analysis technique to assess
whether proﬁts or losses can be predicted in late payment events and in early settlement of
loan agreements.
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